计算机科学技术学报 ›› 2022,Vol. 37 ›› Issue (1): 266-276.doi: 10.1007/s11390-021-0583-x

所属专题: Computer Networks and Distributed Computing

• • 上一篇    



  • 收稿日期:2020-05-06 修回日期:2021-12-01 接受日期:2021-12-29 出版日期:2022-01-28 发布日期:2022-01-28

A Blockchain-Based Protocol for Malicious Price Discrimination

Li-De Xue1 (薛立德), Ya-Jun Liu2 (刘亚军), Wei Yang1,* (杨威), Member, IEEE, Wei-Lin Chen1 (陈蔚林), and Liu-Sheng Huang1 (黄刘生), Member, IEEE        

  1. 1School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230000, China
    2Information Department, the First Affiliated Hospital of Soochow University, Suzhou 215000, China
  • Received:2020-05-06 Revised:2021-12-01 Accepted:2021-12-29 Online:2022-01-28 Published:2022-01-28
  • Contact: Wei Yang E-mail:qubit@ustc.edu.cn
  • About author:Wei Yang is an associate professor in School of Computer Science and Technology at the University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei. In 2007, he received his Ph.D. degree in computer science from University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, and was awarded the Dean's Prize of Chinese Academy of Sciences. His research interests include information security, quantum information and wireless networks. He has authored or co-authored over 120 technical papers in major international journals and conferences. In 2014, he got the Natural Science Award of Ministry of Education of People's Republic of China. In 2016, he won the Best Paper Award at ACM UbiComp.
  • Supported by:
    This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.62172385, and the Anhui Initiative in Quantum Information Technologies under Grant No.AHY150300.

价格歧视(price discrimination)实质上是一种价格差异,通常指商品或服务的提供者在向不同的买方提供相同等级、相同质量的商品或服务时,在买方之间实行不同的销售价格或收费标准。卖方没有正当理由,就同一种商品或者服务,对若干买方实行不同的售价,则构成价格歧视行为。中国的《价格法》中明确规定:价格歧视为不正当价格行为,并规定了比较严厉的惩罚措施。但如今,价格歧视的现象仍屡见不鲜,主要面临的困境有:价格歧视界定的困难,价格歧视的福利结果具有不确定性,多维度的价格歧视等。 区块链(blockchain)从本质上来说是一个共享数据库,存储于其中的数据或信息,具有“不可伪造”“全程留痕”“可以追溯”“公开透明”“集体维护”等特征,其被广泛用于去中心化的缺乏信用的场景中。

关键词: 区块链, 数字经济, 分布式应用, 价格歧视, 价格透明

Abstract: Serious price discrimination emerges with the development of big data and mobile networks, which harms the interests of consumers. To solve this problem, we propose a blockchain-based price consensus protocol to solve the malicious price discrimination faced by consumers. We give a mathematical definition of price discrimination, which requires the system to satisfy consistency and timeliness. The distributed blockchain can make the different pricing of merchants transparent to consumers, thus satisfying the consistency. The aging window mechanism of our protocol ensures that there is no disagreement between any node on the consensus on price or price discrimination within a fixed period, which meets the timeliness. Moreover, we evaluate its performance through a prototype implementation and experiments with up to 100 user nodes. Experimental results show that our protocol achieves all the expected goals like price transparency, consistency, and timeliness, and it additionally guarantees the consensus of the optimal price with a high probability.

Key words: blockchain, digital economy, distributed application, price discrimination, price transparency

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