New Sealed-Bid Electronic Auction with Fairness, Security and Efficiency

Electronic sealed-bid auction schemes usually have a common drawback,the third party (auction host) can conspire with a malicious bidder toleak all bidding prices before the opening stage. It results in themalicious bidder wining the auction with an optimal bidding price.Recently, Liaw \it et al. proposed an auction protocol for electroniconline bidding in which they designed a deposit deduction certificationfor government procurement. However, it also has above mentioned flaw.Moreover, we further found that there were some extra securitydrawbacks in their protocol. First, the bidder can forge a biddingreceipt to claim that he/she is a valid auction winner. Second, it maysuffer from the third party forging attack. Third, their protocolleaked some bidders' private information to the third party, such asthe bidder's bank account number and the authorization code. Thus, itcannot protect the bidder's privacy at all. In this paper, we notonly point out the drawbacks from the previous scheme but also proposea new electronic auction scheme to overcome the above mentioneddrawbacks. Furthermore, the computational complexity can be decreasedin our online sealed-bid auction scheme.