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Volume 26 Issue 4
July  2011
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Ji-Qiang Lv. Differential Attack on Five Rounds of the SC2000 Block Cipher[J]. Journal of Computer Science and Technology, 2011, 26(4): 722-731. DOI: 10.1007/s11390-011-1171-2
Citation: Ji-Qiang Lv. Differential Attack on Five Rounds of the SC2000 Block Cipher[J]. Journal of Computer Science and Technology, 2011, 26(4): 722-731. DOI: 10.1007/s11390-011-1171-2
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Differential Attack on Five Rounds of the SC2000 Block Cipher

  • Department of Computer Science, Ecole Normale Superieure, 45 Rue d'Ulm, Paris 75005, France

Funds: This work as well as the author was supported by the French ANR Project SAPHIR II.
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  • Received Date: November 24, 2010
  • Revised Date: May 02, 2011
  • Published Date: July 04, 2011
    Abstract
  • The SC2000 block cipher has a 128-bit block size and a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which employs a total of 6.5 rounds if a 128-bit user key is used. It is a CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher in Japan. In this paper we address how to recover the user key from a few subkey bits of SC2000, and describe two 4.75-round differential characteristics with probability 2-126 of SC2000 and seventy-six 4.75-round differential characteristics with probability 2-127. Finally, we present a differential cryptanalysis attack on a 5-round reduced version of SC2000 when used with a 128-bit key; the attack requires 2125.68 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2125.75 5-round SC2000 encryptions. The attack does not threat the security of the full SC2000 cipher, but it suggests for the first time that the safety margin of SC2000 with a 128-bit key decreases below one and a half rounds.
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    • References (21)
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